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In realisation of the very strategic role of inter-
national trade to her economy, Nigeria has since in-
dependence in 1960 adopted various policy measures to 
boost her foreign trade and to expand her external market. 
The country has adopted certain regulatory measures to 
change the directional pattern of her.foreign trade. Such 
measures which are also often aimed at other policy ob-
jectives (like balance of payments., protection and rev-
enue) include tariff changes, exchange control and 
quantitative control in form of import quota or complete 
ban. In addition, Nigeria has made several attempts at 
economic cooperation with foreign countries and groupings. 
Many bilateral trade agreements with other countries have 
been signed. More importantly, Nigeria has been very 
active in the pursuit ·of economic integration as an 
important aspect of her international commercial policy. 
In this study, attention will be f.ocused on two out-
standing efforts towards such integration; the attempt 
to become an associated member of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the move towards the formation of 
a West African Economic Community. 
Section I of the paper outlines the various types of 
economic integration; Section II discusses the theoretical 
framework of economic integration; Section III contains 
a brief review of Nigeria's efforts to become associated 
with the EEC; and Section IV examines the level of trade 
and economic cooperation in West Africa, the move towards 
the establishment of a West African Economic Community 
and the prospects and problems of such a community. 
I. Types of Integ~ation 
Five types of economic integration which entail different 
degrees of econ£mic cooperation have been identified in 
the literature. Firstly, there is the free trade area 
where tariffs and other trade restrictions .between the 
participating countries are abolished while each member 
country adopts its own external tariffs and other com-
mercial policies against non~member countries. The 
European Free Trade Association formed in 1960 by seven 
Western European countries including the United Kingdom 
was a typical example of a free trade area. 2 Secondly, 
there is the customs union which involves the abolition 
of all forms of internal restrictions on trade within 
the union and the adoption of a common external tariff 
policy by all member countries. The common market where 
trade restrictions and impediments to factor movement 
are abolished is the third form of economic integration. 
Fourthly, there is the economic union which combines the 
abolition of restrictions on both commodity and factor 
movements with some degree of harmonisation of national 
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economic policies. The European Economic Community has 
the characteristics of a customs union and an economic 
union~-La:stlYI -and-tnennghes;:-degrE!e-of-eiconomi-c----'--
integration, is total economic integration which involves 
the unification of monetary, fiscal, social and other 
policies and requires the establishment of a supra-
national agency whose decisions are binding on all member 
states. Among other factors, the great concern for 
national sovereignty makes the achievement of complete 
economic integration among nations a very difficult task 
to accomplish. 
II. Theo~etiaaZ F~amewo~k 
The first rigorous' study of the effects of a customs 
union was undertaken by Professor J. Viner. 3 The general 
conclusion by economists prior to Viner's path-breaking 
analysis was that a customs union would increase world 
welfare since it was a move towards free trade. 
Viner demonstrated that the effects of economic 
unions could be beneficial or detrimental. He analysed 
the effects in terms of trade creation and trade 
diversion. 4 Trade is created when the locus of production 
for a particular commodity shifts because of tariff 
changes, induced by formation of the customs union, from 
a higher-cost domestic source to a lower-cost producer 
in a member country, while trade is diverted when there 
is a shift in supply from a lower-cost non-member country 
to a higher-cost partner. His conclusion was that trade 
creation would have a positive welfare effect because it 
would increase world trade while trade diversion would 
have a negative welfare effect since it would merely 
reallocate a non-expanded volume of world trade in favour 
of union members in an inefficient way. Thus, Viner con-
centrated on the analysis of static efficiency conditions. 
The analysis rested in part on the classic argument for 
the abolition or reduction of trade barriers which would 
lead to advantageous reallocation of production between 
participating countries. His evaluation of production 
effect (trade creation and trade diversion) and the con-
sumption effect of economic union was in terms of 
constant overall world output and constant world con-
sumption. 
Other economists have followed Viner by clarifying 
and elaborating on his exposition. Some of their analyses, 
especially on the dynamic effects of economic integration, 
which are relevant to our discussion will be evaluated, 
later. Important among' the dynamic effects are 'the 
potential effects of larger markets on the rate of growth 
through affecting the rate of technological change and 
investment, through increasing the effectiveness of 
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competition and through the possible existence of internal 
and external economies.' 5 
III. Nigeria and the European Economic Community 
When the first Yaounde Convention which linked 18 Afro-
Malagasy states with the EEC was signed in 1963, the 
Community issued the DeaZaration of Intentions in which 
three types of association between the Community and 
developing countries were offered. These are the 
Yaounde-type association which allows for an unrestricted 
flow of exports of individual countries to the EEC and 
the privilege of financial aid and loan, some looser 
type of association, or special trade relations that 
are individually negotiated. Consequently, in 1963, 
Nigeria started to negotiate for associate status with 
the EEC and by 1966 an agreement had been reached. Before 
the terms of the agreement are evaluated, it is desirable 
to trace the reasons why Nigeria finally decided to 
seek a free trade arrangement with the EEC in 1963 even 
though a year earlier at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
Conference the Nigerian Government emphatically rejected 
any form of associate status. 6 
A number of distinct factor~ seem to have generated 
Nigeria's strong desire to become an associated member of 
the EEC. First and probably the most crucial factor was 
Nigeria's growing trade wi,th EEC member countries. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the destinations and sources of 
Nigeria's exports and imports between 1960 and 1972. 
A salient characteristic during the period was that in 
relative terms there was a gradual decline in Nigeria's 
trade with the UK and a gradual rise in her trade with 
the EEC. In 1960, Nigeria exported 47.6 per cent (worth 
N161.4 million) of her exports to the UK and 30.2 per cent 
(worth NI02.8 million) to the EEC. ~y 1972 the UK share 
in Nigerian export value had declined by 26 percentage 
points to 21 per cent while the share 'of the EEC was 
37.6 per cent, having reached a peak of 40.8 in 1967. 
Comparative figures for imports (Table 2) show that 
the UK's relative share of Nigerian import value declined 
from 42.9 per cent in 1960 to 29.5 per cent in 1972 
while the EEC' s share rose. from 19.5 per cent in 1960 
to a peak of 30.2 per cent in 1972. It. was in 1967 that 
the UK lost first place to the EEC as the chief 
customer of Nigeria, and by 1972 the UK had also ceased 
to be the chief source of Nigerian imports as the EEC 
took over as the chief supplier. In respect of both 
exports and imports, it was in 1970 that theEEC emerged 
as Nigeria's largest trading partner. 
The replacement of the UK by the EEC as Nigeria's 
main trading partner can be explained in different ways. 
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First was the loosening of traditional economic ties 
betw.§!.§!D tbJ! tJK alld Nig.§!ri~Cl, Cl,fter the latter ' ~s indeJ;>end,ence~~ 
These economic ties had been built up over the colonial 
days through the 'colony-mother country' relationship 
and thr9ugh the Commonwealth preferential treatment 
which included the. privilege of non-reciprocal preferential 
treatment of Nigerian exports in the UK market. Although 
by the late 1960s the Commonwealth preferential arrangement 
was still in existence, some of its provisions had been 
eroded by the Kennedy Round of talks which reduced or 
eliminated some of the preferential rates that were 
operative under the Commonwealth preferential trade 
agreement. Secondly, the steady decline in the UK's 
share of world trade could have contributed to the decline 
in her share of Nigerian imports and exports. For example, 
while the UK accounted for 8.0 per cent of world trade in 
1966, its share declined to 7.6 and 7.2 per cent in 1967 
and 1970 respectively.7 Thirdly, the quick economic 
recovery of EEC members (especially west Germany, France 
and Italy) from their war-time devastation meant an 
expanded market for Nigeria's exports· and an enlarged 
source of consumer goods and capital equipment which 
Nigeria need ardently for industrialisation •. Lastly, the 
growing practice of tying aid purchases in the donor 
countries meant more imported commodities from the EEC 
countries whose foreign aid to Nigeria has increased 
since the latter's independence. . 
EEC countries have always been prominent purchasers 
of specific Nigerian products. For example, in 1963 when 
Nigeria started to negotiate with the EEC, the proportions 
of some important Nigerian exports purchased by the 
Community were: cotton 61 per cent, hardwoods 58 per cent, 
groundnuts 55 per cent, palm kernels 47 per cent and cocoa 
36 per cent.8 Hence, in recognition of the EEC as an 
important market for Nigerian exports and mindful of the 
adverse effects of the Community's tariffs on Nigerian 
exports, negotiations for associate membership of the 
Community were ,started in mid-1964. 
The second factor which probably influenced Nigeria's 
decision to seek associate membership of the EEC was its dis-
advantageous position relative to the 18 associated members 
of the EEC whose products, many of which are in competition 
with Nigerian products, enter the Community duty free. 
For example, with Senegal's groundnuts and Ivory Coast's 
cocoa entering the EEC free of duty while Nigerian 
groundnuts and cocoa are subjected to duty, there could 
be a diversion of trade from Nigeria towards the group 
embracing the EEC and the associated members. Thus, the 
signing in 1963 of the Yaounde Convention which replaced 
the association status that linked the 18 African countries 
with the EEC under the Treaty of Rome (which established 
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TabZe 1 
Destination of Nigeria's Exportsa by RegionaZ Groupings 
.1960-1972 (f.o.b) 
Year Eastern . EE~ Japan UK USA West Others Total 
Europe Africa 
Value 
(1)1 Million) 
1960 1.3 102.8 5.1 161.4 31.8 2.2 34.8 339.4 
1961 1.2 115.9 6-.6 153.1 38.2 2.9 29.5 347.4 
1962 3.4 113.3 3.0 138.4 36.2 9.2 33.7 337.2 
1963 2.9 138.6 4.7 147.6 34.8 11.2 38.8 378.6 
1964 10.1 153.2 5.1 161.4 28,6 14.9 56.1 429.4 
1965 17.5 186.4 6.3 203.0 52.4, 10.6 60.2 536.4 
1966 14.2 201.0 8.5 211. 7 45.2 11.1 76.1 567.8 
1967 14.3 197.4 12.4 144·2 37.9 7.2 70.2 483.6, 
1968 19.1 150.8 7.4 121.9 35.0 12.7 75.3 422.2 
1969 22.7 226.0 6.0 175.6 80.2 9;3 116.6 636.4 
1970 31.7 327.6 6.8 250.4 101.6 7.2 160.1 885.4 
1971 44.3 499.8 18.6 278.8 223.5 26.8 201.4 1,293.2 
1972b 25.6 539.0 .55.2 300.9 299.6 29.8 183.9 1,434.0 
Percentages 
1960 0.4 30.2 1.5 47.6 9.4 0.6 10.3 100.0 
1961 0.3 33.4 1.9 44.1 11.0 0.8 8.8 100.0 
1962 1.0 33.6 0.9 41.0 10.7 2.7 ' 10.0 100.0 
1963 0.8 36.6 1.2 39.0 9.2 3.0 10.2 100.0 
1964 2.4 35.7 1.2 37.6 6.7 3.5 13.1 100.0 
1965 3.3 34.8 1.2 37.8 9.8 2.0 11.2 100.0 
1966 2.5 35.4 1.5 37.3 8.0 2.0 13.4 100.0 
1967 3.0 40.8 2.6 29.8 7.'8 1.5 14.5 100.0 
1968 4.5 35.7 1.8 28.9 8.3 3.0 17.8 100.0 
1969 3.6 35.5 0.9 27.6 12.6 1.5 18.3 100.0 
1970 3.6 37.0 0.8 28.3 11.5 0.8 18.1 100.0 
1971 3.4 38.6 1.4 21.6 17.3 2.1 15.6 100.0 
1972 1.8 37.6 3.8 21.0 20.9 2.1 12.8 100.0 
alnclude Re-exports 
bprovisional 
Sources: Central Bank of Nigeria, Eaonomia and FinanaiaZ Review 
(December 1972) I Federal Office of Statistics, Review of 
ExternaZ Trade (1972) • 
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TabZe 2 
Soupoea of Nigepia'a Impopta by RegionaZ G~oupinga 
1960-1972 (o.i.f.) 
Year Eastern EEC Japan UK USA west Others Total 
Europe Africa 
Value 
(101 Million) 
1960 8.6 84.3 55.6 182.8 23.2 1.3 76.0 431.8 
1961 10.9 88.7 61.6 170.6 23.8 1.5 87.9 445.0 
1962 12.1 78.5 49.7 147.7 29.9 0.8 87.3 406.0 
1963 14.0 90.0 53.8 141.6 35.8 1.2 78.8 415.2 
1964 15.1 117.6 61.6 157.4 57.8 2.2 95.7 507.4 
1965 14.6 136.5 51.2 170.1 66.2 1.6 110.4 550.6 
1966 14.2 135.6 28.6 152.5 83.0 2.4 96.3 512.6 
1967 16.7 115.0 37.5 129.2 55.7 2.5 90.6 447:2 
. 1968 19.1 106.6 14.3 119.7 44.6 3.8 77.1 385.2 
1969 19.1 125.4 18.9 172.7 58.5· 2.8 100.0 497.4 
1970 34.2 202.8 47.4 232.0 109.6 3.3 127.1 756.4 
1971 43.6 271.6 89.7 344.1 151.4 3.1 175.5 1,079.0 
1972a 25.4 299.0 98.2 291.9 103.1 3.1 169.8 990.6 
Percentages 
1960 2.0 19.5 12.9 42.9 5.4 0.3 17.6 100.0 
1961 2.4 19.9 13.8 38.3 5.3 0.3 19.8 100.0 
1962 3.0 19.3 12.2 36.4 7.4 0.2 21.5 100.0 
1963 3.4 21.7 13.0 34.1 8.5 0.3 19.0 100.0 
1964 3.0 23.1 12.0 31.0 11. 3 0.4 18.9 100.0 
1965 2.7 24.7 9.3 30.9 12.0 0.3 20.1 100.0 
1966 2.8 26.4 5.6 29.7 16.2 0.5 18.8 100.0 
1967 3.7 25.6 8.3 28.7 12.5 0.6 20.3 100.0 
1968 4.8 27.6 3.7 31.0 11.5 1.0 20.0 100.0 
1969 3.8 25.2 3.8 34.7 11.8 0.6 20 • .1 100.0 
1970 4.0 26.7 6.3 30.7 14.5 0.4 16.9 100.0 
1971 4.3 25.2 8.4 31.9 14.0 0.3 16.2 100.0 
1972 2.6 30.2 9.9 29.5 10.4 0.3 17.2 100.0 
aprovisional 
Sources: Central Bank of Nigeria, Eoonomio and FinanoiaZ Review 
(December 1972); Federal Office of Statistics, 
Review of ExtePnaZ Tpade (1972) • 
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the Conununity), must have influenced government thinking 
in Nigeria. 
Thirdly, the decision of the UK in the early 1960s 
to join the EEC must have contributed in some way towards 
the change of policy by the Nigerian Government. If the 
UK had been admitted into the Conununity say by 1963 
when President Charles DeGaulle vetoed her application, 
about four-fifths of Nigeria's exports would have been 
sold to the enlarged market while almost two-thirds of 
her imports would have originated from the area (Tables 
1 and 2). Nigeria would have been confronted with the 
conunon external tariffs of the EEC while the 18 associated 
members would have unrestricted flow of exports into the 
UK market in addition to that of 'the Six'. Nigerian 
exports which for decades had enjoyed the Conunonwealth 
preferential treatment would lose the long outstanding 
preferential position. 
Nigeria's negotiations for associate status with the 
EEC was concluded in July 1966 when a tentative agreement 
was reached. It was expected to last until 1969. Under 
the terms of the agreement,9 most Nigerian exports were 
to enter the EEC duty free, the exceptions being cocoa, 
groundnuts, palm oil and plywood. These four products 
were to be subjected to a three per cent yearly expanding 
duty free quota while exports in excess of the quotas 
were to be subjected to normal duties ranging between 
5 and 15 per cent. In exchange for these concessions, 
Nigeria was to grant tariff preferences of between 2 and 
5 per cent to 26 manufactured products from the EEC 
representing 4 per cent of her aggregate imports and 8.2 
per cent of her imports from the Conununity in 1965. Also,. 
Nigeria was to be allowed to retain or introduce 
quantitative restrictions on her imports from the EEC in 
order to meet her industrialisation and development needs 
or in the event of difficulties in her balance of payments. 
However, Nigeria was not expected to receive financial 
aid from the EEC as did the 18 associated African States. 
The Nigerian civil war led to a deterioration of 
political relations between Nigeria and some EEC members 
(especially France) and the agreement was never ratified. lO 
Consequently, in September 1968, Nigeria decided to abandon 
her efforts to become an associated member of the EEC. 
Since Nigeria's unsuccessful attempt to get associated 
with the EEC, the East African Economic Conununity consisting 
of Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya has entered into a trade 
agreement with the EEC as a result of the signing of the 
Arusha Convention in July 1968. The Arusha-type association 
provides for most exports of the East African countries to 
be admitted to the EEC free of customs duties. Other 
co,untries like Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria have signed 
separate special association agreements with the Conununity. 
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Post-civil war Nigerian government policy still favourstne speciTar~£raae~agreemeP:t type ~ of~ as socia tron. 
This was indicated by the Federal Commissioner for Finance 
at the Meeting of the Commonweaith Finance Ministers 
in September 1972 when he declared: 
••• Nigeria would opt for a special trade agreement. For a number 
of reasons this choice seems to be the most appropriate. The 
reverse preferences attached to the Yaounde Convention and the 
quota limitations attached to the Arusha-type association make 
them unsuitable for Nigeria. The rigidity of rules for establishing 
new industries, and the insistance on reciprocity on tariff 
concessions under the Yaounde Convention will perpetuate unequal 
partnerships, while the probable costly losses in revenue that 
will arise from tariff concessions that may not be compensated for 
by increased export earnings from the Community because of quota 
restrictions will tend to retard rather than promote trade in the 
Arusha-type association. 11 
The strength of the EEC as an economic force has been 
heightened by the admission of the UK, Eire and Denmark 
to the Community in January 1973. Hence in 1973 the 'big 
Nine' controlled as high as 43.0 per cent of total world 
trade. 12 
Just recently, 46 developing countries from the African, 
the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) regional groupings 
have concluded a trade agreement with the enlarged EEC. 
The agreement which was signed in Lome, Togo, in February 
1975 and which is yet to be ratified by the individual 
countries, will replace the Yaounde and Arusha Agreements. 
Among other things, the new agreement provides for an 
export price stabilisation scheme for products of ACP 
countries and the export of most of these countries' 
primary products into the EEC duty free without any 
reciprocity. 
IV. Trade and Econnmie Cooperation in Weat Afrrica 
(a) Level, o,f Intra-Weat African Trade. Nigeria's trade with 
other West African countries has always been disappoint-
ingly insignificant. Tables 1 and 2 indicate that during 
the period 1960-1972, Nigerian exports to the West African 
sub-region were never up to 4 per cent of total export 
value, i.e. 3.5 per cent in 1964 when they were at their 
peak. And apart from 1968, the value of Nigerian imports 
from other West African countries did not reach the one 
per cent level. Between 1968 and 1972, the relative share 
of West African countries in Nigerian imports was on the 
decline from one per cent to 0.3 per cent while between 
9 
1970 and 1972 the value declined from N3. 3 million to 
N3.1 million. During the review period Nigeria sold much 
more to other West African countries than it purchased 
from them, resulting in a persistent favourable trade 
balance which widened at the close of the period. The 
country's exports to other West African countries 
consist of a variety of goods such as petroleum, 
especially to Ghana, primary products (e.g. palm produce 
and groundnuts) and light manufactures. 
Generally, intra-West African trade is very low 
despite the fact that external trade is very crucial to 
the economies of the countries in the sub-region. About 
97 per cent of the sub-region's trade is with outside 
c,ountries. 
TaNe 3 
In~a-Subregional Trade as a Portion of Total External Trade 
1966 
3.3% 
1967 
3.5% 
1968 
3.1% 
1969 
2.5% 
1970 
2.2% 
Sourae: Central Bank of Nigeria, Eoonomia and Finanaial Review 
(June 1972), p.7. 
As table 3 shows, between 1966 and 1970 intra-West African 
trade averaged just about 3 per cent of the region's total 
foreign trade. Disappointingly, there was a persistent 
decline in the relative share of intra-subregional trade 
between 1967 and 1970. 
It may be necessary to point out that these figures 
are for recorded trade. A significant proportion of trade 
between the countries in the region is usually unrecorded. 
In a study by Henry Henuser it was estimated that 
'unrecorded intra-regional trade in West Africa, far 
exceeds the officially published figures by nearly three-
fold,.13 In another study by the International Monetary 
Fund, the unrecorded trade between Ghana and the Entente 
countries was estimated as varying between half and ten-
fold of the volume of recorded trade. 14 The main factors 
responsible for the sUbstantial volume of unrecorded trade 
are the common practice of not recording goods that are 
not subject to, or exempted from, duties; the under-
valuation of commodities due to the official estimation 
methods; and the very high rate of smuggling which is 
marked in respect of certain primary export products 
(e.g. cocoa), manufactured consumer goods (e.g. textiles) 
and alcoholic beverages. lS The very high rate of smuggling 
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in West Africa may be ascribed to various' factors 
'including price disparities in neighbouring countries 
. as-a-resu'J;t-of-d:tf ferent-tar Hf' ~sy's·t:ellfs-in"-opei:'at'1oni-the 
imposition of strict exchange controls, which have 
induced many unscrupulous people to smuggle export 
produce to neighbouring countries to obtain foreign 
exchange, and perhaps utilise it to buy .and smuggle 
goods which a~e under ban, or whose importation had been 
restricted.' 16 
Whatever may be the rate of smuggling in West Africa, 
it remains an indisputable fact that the level of intra~ 
West African trade is deplorably low. Assuming that only' 
about half of intra-regional trade is usually recorded, 
the level of trade would still be very low vis-a-vis the 
level of intra-regional trade in other regional groupings. 
Table 4 shows an appropriate comparison. 
TabZe 4 
Intra-Trade in SeZeoted Regions of the WorZd 1966/1966 
Region 
Africa 
West Africa 
Latin America 
Asia and Far East 
Eastern Europe 
Western Europe 
Share of intra-trade in TotaZ 
Trade of Region (%) 
7.7 
2.7 
9.8 
24.5 
63.2 
64.0 
SoUZ'oe:. UNCTAD Handbook of Inte:rnationaZ Trade and /JeveZopment 
Statistios J 1965 (Adopted ;i;rom C,O, Ilo:d, IT;rade 
Constraints i A Barrier to Econom;l.c Coopera.t;i,on 
in West Africa' ,The JOUZ'naZ of Eoonomio and SodaZ 
StudiesJ 15,3, (NoveIilber 1973),405-422. 
The less than three per cent (or about six per cent if we 
take unrecorded trade into consideration) intra-West 
African subregional trade compares quite poorly with the 
other sub-groups. Each of the regional groupings of 
Eastern and Western Europe did more trading internally 
than with the outside world. 
(b) Trade Constraints. Various historical, political, economic 
and social factors that hinder intra~African trade in 
general and intra~West African trade in particular, have 
been identified. In the first place, West African countries I 
commercial policies and marketing channels are geared 
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towards enhancing trade with former colonial powers in 
particular and with the industrial countries in general. 
These policies have great bias against intra-regional 
trade. Almost all forms of restrictive commercial policies 
are in operation in the west African sub-region. Such 
policy measures include tariff barriers, licensing controls, 
restrictions through quota and import prohibition. The 
Francophone countries accord preferential treatment to 
EEC countries and other countries in the Franc zone while 
the products from their fellow west African countries not 
in the zone are subjected to vari.ous restrictions .17 For 
example, in the mid-1960s, Dahomey, a former French colony 
and a member of the Francophone community, let in French 
cigarettes duty-free while charging duty of nearly 100 
per cent on Nigerian cigarettes manufactured less than 
a hundred miles away.1B Thus, the directional flow of the 
foreign trade of West African countries reflects their 
colonial past. 
Secondly, there are poor and inadequate transportation 
networks and communication facilities within West African 
countries relative to those linking them with the 
industrialised countries, especially with their respective 
metropolitan countries. Roads and railways were developed 
by colonial powers to suit political administration and to 
convey export crops and raw materials from area of 
production to ports of shipment to Europe. Due to the 
competitive policies (both economic and political) of the 
colonial powers, railway lines do not cross monetary zones 
and only in few cases do they cross national frontiers. 
The remark made by the former Ethiopian Emperor Haile 
Selassie at the inaugural meeting of the OAU in 1963, 
even though directed to depict the African situation in 
general, is still valid for the current situation in West 
Africa. 
Today, travel between African states and telegraphic and telephonic 
communications among us are circuitous in the extreme. Road 
communications between two neighbouring states are often difficult 
or·even impossible. It is little wonder that trade among us has 
remained at a discouragingly low level ••• 19 
Another important explanatory factor for the low level of 
intra-West African trade is the set-up of financial 
institutions and payment arrangement in West Africa. 
Exchange controls, which are sometimes very stringent, 
and payment difficulties between West African countries 
often lead to delays in the receipt of export earnings 
from other countries in the area. Such problems are 
inimical to the expansion of intra-regional trade. 
Furthermore, various payment facilities that involve 
bank transfers, external currencies and the direction 
of payments through the international exchange markets 
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in London and Paris, do not speed the flow of intra~West 
African trade;20 The existence of many monetary systems 
in the-~sub"'-region--also-has- a-trade-h.tnder-ing--impact-. --A-f-ter 
their political independence, West African countries 
retained the currencies of their respective metropolitan 
countries. Consequently, in the area today, there are 
a sterling zone, a franc zone, a dollar zone, a peso 
zone and a peseta area. Hence, besides the quasi-magnetic 
attraction between the mother country and its former colony, 
such currency grouping facilitates trade between the two 
because exchange and payment problems are usually non-
existent. Moreover, whenever there are emergency exchange 
restrictions and general currency inconvertibility, the 
financial links between the mother country and the ex-
colony become much more reinforced. 21 
Fourthly, the economic structure of West African 
countries with its pattern of production and demand which 
is oriented towards trade with overseas countries tends 
to hinder internal trade in West Africa. 22 For example, 
most of the imports of West African countries are 
manufactures that are produced outside Africa. Predominantly, 
the locally produced semi-manufactures and manufactures 
serve as import substitutes, hence the insignificant level 
of exportation. The few locally produced manufactures that 
are exchanged within the West African sub-region face 
stiff competition from foreign products that are usually 
cheaper and of superior quality. Export-wise, it has been 
estimated that most of the 10 main primary products of 
West Africa that account for at least 85- per cent of 
export'earnings of the sub-region, are demanded in . 
commercial quantities outside the area. The 10 products 
are: cocoa, coffee, cotton, groundnuts, livestock, fish,· 
palm products, diamonds, iron-ore and crude petroleum. 
Only livestock and fish are in great local demand. 
Lastly, intra-West· African trade in farm products has 
often been impeded by the sale of commodities by developed 
countries to West African countries on concessional basis. 
The most conspicuous of such a policy is the surplus 
disposal by the United States under 'Public Law 480'. 
Very often the concessional sale by the US, which is a 
clever way of circumventing the prohibition of dumping 
by GATT, makes it cheaper for African countries to buy 
some primary products from the US than to buy from 
neighbouring West African countries. Thus, the sale of 
food surpluses to Wes.t African countries tends to direct 
food-purchase patterns to the detriment of tropical 
exporting countries and could hinc'ier meaningful intra~ 
West African food policy or trade. 23 
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(a) Sub-regionaZ Traik Patte:m. Another characteristic of 
intra-West African trade is the concentration of trade 
within each major monetary zone thus making inter-zonal 
trade quite low. In 1970, the intra-trade of the seven 
French-speaking countries that form the West African 
Monetary Union amounted to about 69 per cent and 81 
per cent of their total West African exports and imports 
respectively.24 However, the degree of trade concentration 
within the sterling area (Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone) is less than that of the zonal concentration 
within the franc group. 
Responsible for the low level of inter-zonal trade 
and economic cooperation are such factor~ as colonial 
heritage, the relatively low level of trade restrictions 
within each group, the easy transfer of payments due to 
the use of a common currency or the use of a trading 
currency common to wembers and perhaps the existence of 
a common language. 2 On the other hand, the greater 
concentration of trade and the stronger and much more 
effective economic cooperation among West African French-
speaking countries may be attributed to the contiguity of 
the territories, thus enhancing freer mobility of people 
and the fact that all these countries (except Guinea) 
have been associated members of the EEC since its inception. 
(d) TOUJa:r>ds a West Afnaan Eaonomia Community. Recognising the 
very low level of intra-West African trade and with a 
view to improving the situation, West African countries 
have been 'making attempts to form a West African Common 
Market or Customs Union. Nigeria has played a leading 
role in the various attempts. 
Also,' the desirability of economic cooperation among 
developing countries has been expressed by United Nations 
sponsored conferences and commissions. Thus, in its FinaZ 
Aat and Report in 1964 the First UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD I) recommended that: 
Regional economic groupings, integration or other forms of economic 
cooperation should be promoted among developing countries as a means 
of expanding their intra-regional and extra-regional trade and 
encouraging their economic growth and their industrial and agricultural 
diversification with due regard to the special features of development 
of the various countries concerned, as well as their economic and 
social systems. 26 ' , 
The same opinion was expressed by the Pearson Commission 
which, apart from its recommendation for tariff elimination 
or reduction among developing countries, also recommended 
that the IMP and UNCTAD should look into the feas~bility 
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ofa clearing arrangement among these countries. 27 Also, 
the Economiq CCll!Im:l.ssion for Africa. (ECA) and theOAU-have 
since the mid-1960s been trying to promote intra-African 
trade and economic 'cooperation on a regional basis. As 
such, Africa has been divided into four regional groupings': 
East Africa, West Africa, North Africa and Central Africa. 
In 1967, the West African Regional Group consisting 
of 12 West African countries,under the auspices of the ECA, 
came to an agreement to form a West African Economic 
Community. Their ultimate aim was to achieve 'a common 
agricultural policy, non-discrimination in inter-state 
trade, coordination in education, training and research, 
common industrial projects and methods of common finanging 
of them, and coordination of development programmes. ,2 
Between 1967 and 1972, very little was achieved in 
the effort to establish a customs union. The lack of progress 
in this direction led to the setting up of micro-economic 
unions which could eventually lead to the ultimate goal 
of an all-embracing regional economic union. In May 1972, 
Togo joined with Nigeria to create what was seen in many 
circles as an 'embryonic West African Economic Community'. 
Both countries extended an invitation to other West African 
countries to join the union. Also, in 1972, an economic' 
community was formed by seven French-speaking West African 
countries: Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Senegal and Dahomey. And in December 1973, the 
continuous effort towards the formation of a macro-economic 
union was given an impetus when 15 West African countries 
agreed in prinCiple to form an Economic Community of West 
African States. 
In May 1975, the treaty establishing the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was signed in 
Lagos by 15 West African countries with an estimated 
population of 124 million and a land area of approximately 
6.5 million square kilometres. The treaty calls for the 
eventual establishment of a customs union among member 
states over a period of 15 years. It is expected that 
during the period members would progressively eliminate 
the tariffs and non-tariff restrictions among them. ,The 
treaty also provides for the elimination of obstacles to 
the free mobility of labour, services and capital. There 
would be a gradual harmonisation of the agricultural, 
monetary and industrial, policies of member states while 
concerted efforts would be made to improve transportation 
and communication within the region. Finally, a fund for 
cooperation, compensation and development ,will be established 
to compensate countries which suffer losses as a result of 
community policies and to finance development projects in 
member states. 
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(e) Theopetiaa7, F1'amewopk and West Afr>i.aan Eaonorma Integmtion. 
The possible effects of the formation of a customs union 
by West African countries in particular and any group of 
developing countries in general have been appraised. What 
seems to have influenced the thinking of many analysts was 
the analysis of Professor Viner. Two general conclusions 
emerged from Professor R.G. Lipsey's discussion of the 
theory of customs union. The first is that, 'given a 
country's volume of international trade, a customs union 
is more likely to raise welfare the higher is the proportion 
of trade with the country's union partner and the lower 
the proportion with the outside world' .29 Emanating from 
the second conclusion is his contention that 'the sort of 
countries who ought to form customs unions are those doing 
a high proportion of their foreign trade with their union 
partner, and making a high proportion of their total 
expenditure on domestic trade,.3D Judging from the low 
level of intra-West African trade, these conclusions would 
seem to indicate that the welfare of the people of the sub-
region may not be raised as a result of the formation of a 
customs union. Hence a group of economists have concluded 
thus: 
The underdeveloped countries included in the various proposals for 
customs unions generally do not trade much with each other. Although 
foreign trade is large relative to national income, a high proportion 
of the trade is with advanced countries. This situation suggests the 
strong likelihood of detrimental production and consumption effects. 31 
Many economists have emphasised the inappropriateness of 
applying Viner's criteria based on the static analysis of 
fixed preference systems, constant factors of production 
and ,constant production functions, and Lipsey's general, 
conclusions to evaluate the possible effects of customs 
union among developing countries. They have a common base 
in their discussion in that they all think that the bene-
ficial effects of customs union in the developing countries 
would be through the dynamic effects, especially that of 
economic growth. Thus, they regard the application of 
Viner's analysis as taking a static view of what is 
essentially a dynamic situation. Firstly, Professor Gerald 
K. Helleiner argues that the developing countries should be 
concerned with the development effect of customs union 
because 'where the principle concern of policymakers is 
that of achieving the maximum rate of growth (and this is 
probably as characteristic an aim of those in the developed 
world as of those in the poorer nations), the trade creation 
and trade diversion aspects of a customs union may be of 
relatively little importance,.32 And according to Professor 
H.M.A. Onitiri, the conditions in the developing countries 
are tremendou~ly different from what exist in the developed 
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world on which the theoretical framework ot economic 
:l,nt~g:r~tipn_has b.een_based. 3:tOni tid -argues- that -the 
critical factors on which the Viner criteria and Lipseyls. 
conclusions were based are among those that West African 
countries are desirous of changing through economic 
integration. In effect, 'the under~developed areas are 
involved in a huge effort to alter the structure of 
their economy and to integrate their foreign trade more 
closely with it than before'.34 Thirdly, Professor G.M, 
Meier thinks that the dynamic etfects that are derivable 
through new investment and a change in the pattern ot 
investment is much more important to any group of 
developing countries that establish. a customs union: 
Where the objective is accelerated development for the members of 
the region, the dynamic gains over the longer run may prove more 
important than the short-period welfare gains through a reallocation 
of a given amount of resources. The case for a customs union rests 
ultimately on a belief that these dynamic gains will be realised 
and will more than offset any possible welfare loss through trade 
diversion. 35 
{f} Pr>oapeata and Pr>obZema, Whenever the provisions of ECOWAS. 
are translated into reality there would be a number of 
beneficial effects. The lowering or elimination of 
artificial trade barriers and improved transport and 
communications systems which would follow the realisation 
would appreciably raise the level of intra-subregional 
trade. The enlargement of the small national markets of 
West African countries would encourage large-scale 
production that could reduce unit costs and enhance 
technological innovations. Economic integration would 
improve the technical efficiency of many industries since 
internal competition wi thin the union would forc.e marginal 
firms to be innovative in order to improve their methods 
of production while both human and capital resources would 
be reallocated from less efficient to more efficient firms. 
Ahd as people and capital move in response to economic 
incentives there would be a better utilisation of resources 
which would enhance productivity. Some harmonisation of 
regional development planning, at least in respect of 
some industries, can confidently be expected to be under~ 
taken by members of the customs union. Such a step could 
lessen 'the wastes of "watertight" compartments of 
industrialisation and the uneconomic multiplication of 
new industries which otherwise result from independent 
industrialisation programming by each country' ,36 For 
example, in 1973, two companies to develop iron deposits 
in Guinea were established by five Atrican states (Guinea, 
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Liberia, Algeria, Nigeria and Zaire) and three foreign 
'companies from Japan, Yugoslavia and Spain. 37 Also, in 
January 1975, Nigeria and Dahomey agreed to establish 
two industrial projects (cement and sugar), both of 
which are to be sited in Dahomey. With common institutional 
arrangements and better contact, members of ECOWAS would 
be able to pursue more vigorously this type of economic 
planning and cooperation. Lastly, when a group of countries 
act as a bargaining unit at any international or inter-
regional trade negotiations, their bargaining power would 
be much stronger than when acting as small and separate 
economic units. 
The·establishment of a customs union in West Africa 
would open up considerable prospects for Nigerian products. 
Even though it has the largest single market in the sub~ 
region, it will need outlets, besides domestic demand, for 
the products of some major projects like the iron and 
steel complex and motor car assembly that are about to 
take-off. Undoubtedly, to be able to produce at full 
capacity in these industries, there must be a larger 
market than the domestic one and the West African sub-
region looks like the immediate possible market. In some 
other import-replacing industries, Nigeria is almost self~ 
sufficient. In 1973, for example, the proportion of 
aggregate supply (domestic production and imports) met 
by domestic production was 99.1 for soft drinks, 98.2 for 
beer including stout, 85.8 for footwear, 95.0 for textiles, 
85.3 for paints and allied products, 94.7 for roofing 
sheets and 89.6 for soap and detergent. 38 Although one 
should give room for the effect of population increase and 
rise in income, both of which will increase domestic demand, 
any significant expansion in these industries will 
necessitate the availability of external markets for the 
increased output • 
. However, there are various problems involved in the 
economic integration of West African countries. In fact, 
the lack of progress for a very long time towards the 
formation of such a community, in spite of repeated 
indication of intention by different countries, underline 
the fundamental problems involved. The unwillingness or 
reluctance to surrender newly-won national sovereignty 
to any supranational body constitutes a major hindrance 
to economic integration. This is probably the only way 
one can explain the retrogressive trend of dismantling 
pre-independence forms of economi~ cooperation among 
British West African countries. The common currency and 
other forms of economic, commercial and research institutions 
which all these countries were sharing before independence, 
had been dismantled as each country jealously set up its 
own national institutions. Such institutions that had 
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withered away as a result of disintegrative tendencies 
were the West African Currency Board, -the--West--African------
Airways Corporation, the West African Cocoa Research 
Institute and the West African Institute of Social and 
Economic Research. Some of the factors which delayed 
the formation of a customs union in the West African· 
sub-region have been summed up thus: 
••• economic policy in the sub-region is usually geared towards the 
raising of revenue from duty, protecting domestic industries that 
offer employment to indigenes and ensure import substitution, 
safeguarding balance of payments because of persistent foreign 
exchange pressures and discharging obligations that arise from 
semi-colonial economic ties with other countries either because 
of the colonial past or by virtue of belonging to particular 
monetary zones. 39 
Another major problem that might impede the full 
realisation of the provisions of ECOWAS is that there 
would be fear by some countries that might not gain as 
much as others. However, as genuine as such fear might 
be, the most essential thing is to ensure that no member-
country is allowed to lose as a result of their economic 
union. As Professor Meier has approvingly quoted Sir Roy 
Harrod: 
A regional free-trade area might increase inequality inside the 
region) ••• It should not, however, be assumed that an increase of 
inequality is necessarily bad, provided that the least favoured 
become just a little better off; an increase in inequality may be 
justified if it is the best way of getting progress in the region. 
as a whole. 40 
Moreover, there are ways of redistributing the gains 
that accrue from an economic union to ensure some degree 
of equity. Some coordinated regional policies for the 
location of industries in the West African sub~region can 
be worked out in such a way that the poor countries can . 
gain substantially. The Nigeria-Dahomey plan to establish 
two industrial projects in Dahomey and the establishment 
of two companies in Guinea by five African countries are 
pointers to the attainability of such an integrated 
regional planning. Although both Nigeria and Dahomey will 
gain from their joint projects, the latter stands to gain 
more, especially in respect of employment opportunities for 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Also, a West African 
Regional Development Bank can be established with the 
richer countries contributing much more towards its working 
capital than the poor countries. Besides, a larger 
proportion of the loans and investments to be made from the 
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funds of the bank can be committed to projects being 
undertaken in the poor member countries of the West 
African Economic Community. In these ways all members 
of the Community can have the welfare of· their people 
enhanced. 
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